Hijacked Flight 11, he had suddenly heard an unfamiliar voice on the frequency—a man’s voice, with an Arabic accent. Zalewski had trouble making out the words, however moments later a second, clearer transmission persuaded him and colleagues that a hijack was under means. The hijacker, they’d conclude, had been making an attempt to deal with the passengers and—unfamiliar with the equipment—inadvertently transmitted to ground management as a substitute. A quality assurance specialist then pulled the tape, listened very carefully, and gured out what the Arabic voice had stated on the preliminary, vague transmission. We are returning to the airport.” This was a giveaway that—had the U.S. army been capable of intervene in time—could have wrecked the operation. What remained unknown, till even later, was that there might have been plans to grab even more.
Moussaoui arrived, paid the stability of the fee—$6,800 in cash he pulled out of a satchel—saying that he wished to y a simulated ight from London to New York’s JFK Airport. At his first session he requested a string of questions, about the fuel capability of a 747, about how to maneuver the airplane in flight, concerning the cockpit management panel—and what damage the airliner would trigger have been it to collide with something. Sensing that this pupil was no mere oddball, that he might have evil intent, the school’s instructors agreed that the FBI must be contacted. The reaction at the Minneapolis eld o ce was immediate and e ective. Moussaoui was detained on the bottom that his visa had expired, and brokers started questioning him and a companion— a Yemeni traveling on a Saudi passport.
“CIA,” he wrote in 2007, “had a quantity of opportunities to notice the signi cant information in our holdings and watchlist al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar. Unfortunately, till August, we missed all of them.… “Yes, individuals made mistakes; each human interplay was removed from the place it needed to be. We, the entire authorities, owed the families of 9/11 higher than they received.” But was it just that CIA “people made mistakes”? Historical mysteries are as often defined by screwups as by darker truths.
As early as 1998, the FBI’s regional o ce had been alerted to the massive variety of Arabs learning to fly within the area. After a tour of that faculty, nevertheless, Atta and Shehhi decided not to enroll. They made their way as a substitute to Venice, Florida, and Hu man Aviation, just a block from the college where sword of souls sea of thieves Jarrah was already at work. No reliable supply, nevertheless, has spoken of seeing Jarrah with Atta and Shehhi in Venice. Their tradecraft was superior to that of the inept fellows who had arrived earlier in California. Actually get the job carried out.” KSM’s confederates dubbed him “Mukhtar”—an Arabic word to indicate a pacesetter, a person respected for his mind.
They learned rapidly that Moussaoui was a Muslim, a reality he had denied to his ight teacher. Showing me your studying expertise … Thanks for having us.” Why had Bush continued to sit down within the classroom—for more than ve minutes—after being advised of the second strike on the Trade Center? Why, many have been to marvel, had he not responded instantly—even with a single terse presidential instruction—when Card advised him the second crash indicated a terrorist attack? Two months later, the President would o er a kind of explanation. He had gone on listening to the schoolchildren, he stated, because he was “very conscious of the cameras.
Crown Prince Abdullah had long fumed about America’s obvious complacency over the plight of the Palestinians. In the spring, he had pointedly declined an invitation to the White House. Three weeks earlier than 9/11, enraged by tv footage of an Israeli soldier putting his boot on the top of a Palestinian woman, he had snapped.
Healthy Defense Department.” He has not said what he thought when passed a note with information of the crash on the Trade Center, but he left for his office. Richard Clarke, the long-serving national coordinator for safety and counterterrorism, assumed the worst, summoned senior safety officers to a videoconference, and headed for the White House. Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice have been already on the White House. ” Cheney, informed of the crash while going over speeches with an aide, started watching the TV coverage.
The decision as to what to say about Saudi Arabia in the Report had been made amid discord and rigidity. Investigators who had probed the Saudi angle believed their work demonstrated an in depth hyperlink between hijackers Mihdhar and Hazmi and the Saudi government. Then, late one night time, as last-minute modifications to the Report had been being made, the investigators acquired alarming information. Senior counsel Snell, their team chief, was on the o ce, closeted with executive director Zelikow, making main modifications to their material and eradicating key elements. The lead investigators, Michael Jacobson and Rajesh De, hurried to the o ce to confront Snell. With lawyerly caution, he said he thought there was insu cient substance to their case towards the Saudis.